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REPLY BRIEF 
The following Reply Brief is offered to the arguments made by 
the State in its Brief filed October 15, 1990. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT LACK JURISDICTION 
TO ENTERTAIN DEFENDANTS MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
HIS NO CONTEST PLEA IN THAT HE WAS NOT 
GOVERNED BY THE 1990 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 
77-13-6, U.C.A. 
The chronology of this case is simple. On July 20, 1987 
Defendant entered his no contest plea to the charge of attempted 
sexual abuse of a child. At that time Section 77-13-6, U.C.A. 
read as follows: 
Withdrawal of Plea. A plea of not guilty may 
be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. A plea of 
guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good 
cause shown and with leave of court. 
As noted by the State, "Under the original version of the statute, 
Defendant's ability to remedy his plea by filing such a motion 
began at the time of his plea and continued ad infinitum." 
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(Appellee's Brief, p. 9). 
In 1989 the guilty plea statute was amended as follows: 
A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest is made by motion, and shall be made within 
thirty days after the entry of the plea. 
Defendant filed his motion to withdraw his no contest plea on 
September 18, 1989. Thus, the State now argues that the amended 
statute is applicable and since Defendant did not file his motion 
within thirty days of his guilty plea there is no jurisdiction. 
The argument raised by the State borders on the frivolous. 
At the time the amended statute was passed almost twenty months 
had elapsed since the time Defendant entered his plea. Even if 
Defendant had been aware of the new amendment to the statute, 
which he was not, he would still have been precluded from filing 
his motion since he did not do so within thirty days after the 
entry of his plea. Basically, the State is arguing that Defendant 
should be punished because he did not file his motion within 
thirty days after his plea was entered even though at the time and 
for almost two years later this was not required. Thus, according 
to the State, any person who entered a plea prior to February of 
1989 is forever precluded from attacking such plea since that 
person did not have the foresight to make the attack within thirty 
days after the plea was entered relying instead upon the existing 
law that had been on the books for decades. 
Aside from the obvious injustice that the State's argument 
would produce to those persons who entered pleas prior to the 1989 
amendment, there is sound legal reasoning why the argument must 
fail. The Utah Supreme Court in the recent case of Smith v. Cook, 
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149 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah, Nov. 29, 1990) addressed an 
argument in which a probation statute was amended subsequent to a 
defendant's conviction restricting the number of months that 
probation could be utilized. The court first noted that Utah Code 
Annotated §68-3-3 (Supp. 1984) provides that "no part of these 
Revised Statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." As 
in the Cook case, the present amendment to Section 77-13-6 does 
not declare itself retroactive. 
The Supreme Court noted the exception to the rule as to 
statutes that are "procedural or remedial" in nature. The Court 
stated, "a statute is considered procedural or remedial, as 
opposed to substantive, if the statute does not enlarge, 
eliminate, or destroy vested rights." Id. at 4. The court 
noted in the Cook case that since the newly amended statute 
limits the time a person can be placed on probation it therefore 
enlarges the rights of an individual who is placed on probation 
and therefore the amendment is substantive and cannot be applied 
retroactively. 
The same reasoning is equally applicable here. Rather than 
enlarging the rights of an individual who enters a plea, the 
present statute substantially reduces it. Whereas before such 
person could bring his motion for relief at any time after the 
plea was entered the new statute now restricts such right to 
within a thirty-day period. Thus, the amendment is substantive 
and is not procedural as claimed by the State. (Appellee's Brief, 
pp. 8-9) . 
In addition, the argument advanced by the State would 
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preclude the defendant from legal redress from an erroneous no 
contest plea. The application urged by the State would violate 
Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution commonly known as 
the open court provision. The Utah Supreme Court in Berry v. 
Beach Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) and Horton v. 
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989) struck down 
statutes of repose on the basis that an injured person who was 
injured six years after the date of purchase of a product as in 
Berry or who was injured seven years after the construction of 
a building as in Horton could not bring a suit against the tort 
feasors even though their causes of action had not even arisen in 
which they could have taken any action. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that such statutes prevent an injured party from redress 
automatically based upon an arbitrary legislative time period and 
that there was no justification for allowing a person to sue a 
product's manufacturer because that person was injured five years 
after the purchase while denying that right to an identical 
plaintiff who was injured six years after the purchase. 
This same principle applies in the instant case. Once thirty 
days had elapsed from Defendant's time of his plea he was, 
according to the State, forever barred from attacking the plea. 
Defendant, of course, did not know this until some two years later 
when the amendment was made. This is no different than a person 
who possesses a product for six years without injury only to be 
injured in the seventh year. There is no reason logically nor 
constitutionally to deny these individuals redress in the court 
system. 
-4-
The argument raised by the State borders on the frivolous. 
At the time the amended statute was passed almost twenty months 
had elapsed since the time Defendant entered his plea. Even if 
Defendant had been aware of the new amendment to the statute, 
which he was not, he would still have been precluded from filing 
his motion since he did not do so within thirty days after the 
entry of his plea. Basically, the State is arguing that Defendant 
should be punished because he did not file his motion within 
thirty days after his plea was entered even though at the time and 
for almost two years later this was not required. Thus, according 
to the State, any person who entered a plea prior to February of 
1989 is forever precluded from attacking such plea since that 
person did not have the foresight to make the attack within thirty 
days after the plea was entered relying instead upon the existing 
law that had been on the books for decades. 
Aside from the obvious injustice that the State's argument 
would produce to those persons who entered pleas prior to the 1989 
amendment, there is sound legal reasoning why the argument must 
fail. The Utah Supreme Court in the recent case of Smith v. Cook, 
149 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah, Nov. 29, 1990) addressed an 
argument in which a probation statute was amended subsequent to a 
defendant's conviction restricting the number of months that 
probation could be utilized. The court first noted that Utah Code 
Annotated §68-3-3 (Supp. 1984) provides that "no part of these 
Revised Statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." As 
in the Cook case, the present amendment to Section 77-13-6 does 
not declare itself retroactive. 
-5-
The Supreme Court noted the exception to the rule as to 
statutes that are "procedural or remedial" in nature. The Court 
stated, "a statute is considered procedural or remedial, as 
opposed to substantive, if the statute does not enlarge, 
eliminate, or destroy vested rights." Id. at 4. The court 
noted in the Cook case that since the newly amended statute 
limits the time a person can be placed on probation it therefore 
enlarges the rights of an individual who is placed on probation 
and therefore the amendment is substantive and cannot be applied 
retroactively. 
The same reasoning is equally applicable here. Rather than 
enlarging the rights of an individual who enters a plea, the 
present statute substantially reduces it. Whereas before such 
person could bring his motion for relief at any time after the 
plea was entered the new statute now restricts such right to 
within a thirty-day period. Thus, the amendment is substantive 
and is not procedural as claimed by the State. (Appellee's Brief, 
pp. 8-9). 
In addition, the argument advanced by the State would 
preclude the defendant from legal redress from an erroneous no 
contest plea. The application urged by the State would violate 
Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution commonly known as 
the open court provision. The Utah Supreme Court in Berry v. 
Beach Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) and Horton v. 
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989) struck down 
statutes of repose on the basis that an injured person who was 
injured six years after the date of purchase of a product as in 
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Berry or who was injured seven years after the construction of 
a building as in Horton could not bring a suit against the tort 
feasors even though their causes of action had not even arisen in 
which they could have taken any action. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that such statutes prevent an injured party from redress 
automatically based upon an arbitrary legislative time period and 
that there was no justification for allowing a person to sue a 
product's manufacturer because that person was injured five years 
after the purchase while denying that right to an identical 
plaintiff who was injured six years after the purchase. 
This same principle applies in the instant case. Once thirty 
days had elapsed from Defendant's time of his plea he was, 
according to the State, forever barred from attacking the plea. 
Defendant, of course, did not know this until some two years later 
when the amendment was made. This is no different than a person 
who possesses a product for six years without injury only to be 
injured in the seventh year. There is no reason logically nor 
constitutionally to deny these individuals redress in the court 
system. 
The argument of the State also violates equal protection. 
The 1989 amendment to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure specifically requires that the court will not accept a 
plea until it has found "that the defendant has been advised of 
the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest." Furthermore, Section 6 provides: 
Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits 
for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest is not a ground for setting the plea aside but 
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may be the ground for extending the time to make a 
motion under §77-13-6. 
Thus, the new rule recognizes both the importance of 
informing a defendant as to the time limit and also recognizes 
that the time provided in §77-13-6 is not fixed in stone and may 
be extended if such advice was not given. Clearly, Defendant was 
never advised of any time limit at the time of his sentence since 
no time limit was in existence. Also, he was never advised of any 
time limit as to any grace period or given any opportunity to 
comply with the newly enacted statute of the thirty-day 
requirement. Refusing to allow Defendant to now argue his motion 
would be a clear denial of equal protection of the law as compared 
with any defendant who is now being sentenced under the new 
procedure. 
The argument made by the State that Defendant still has a 
remedy under the habeas corpus statute is equally without merit. 
If Defendant had a right to bring a habeas corpus action prior to 
the 1989 amendment he had a similar right after the amendment. In 
other words, the language contained in subsection 3 of the amended 
statute relating to habeas corpus is meaningless rhetoric and 
could have just as easily been included in the prior statute. 
This Court in Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1988) 
recognized that "challenge may be made to a guilty plea either 
directly or collaterally." This Court noted some of the 
distinctions between the two routes, such as giving the lower 
court who sentenced the defendant the opportunity to correct the 
sentence rather than referring the matter to a new judge in a 
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habeas corpus action. In addition, if a direct appeal is not 
taken by a defendant then the argument can be made in the habeas 
corpus proceeding that the defendant waived any right to proceed 
further. Wells v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d (Utah 1987). 
Finally, it is interesting to note that in the Cook case in 
which the appellant filed a writ of habeas corpus as now is urged 
by the State, the State maintained that that action was barred by 
§78-12-31.1 which purportedly requires a habeas corpus action to 
be brought within three months from the time a defendant is aware 
or should have been aware of the grounds to be argued. The 
Supreme Court in Cook did not specifically address the validity of 
the three-month statute but instead held that defendant's 
imprisonment under a statute existing prior to 1987 tolled any 
time limitation. The court noted, however, that any ambiguity 
that may exist in these type of statutes should be resolved in 
favor of a criminal defendant. Id. at 4 citing Shelmidine v. 
Jones, 550 P.2d 207 (Utah 1976); State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d 334 (Utah 
1971). See also concurring opinion of J. Zimmerman stating that 
the three-month limitation period is unconstitutional. Id. at 7. 
Thus, the State's suggestion that this matter should be 
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds and refiled as a habeas corpus 
action is not supported by statutory interpretation or case law. 
Nor is it supported by equitable principles. Here, Defendant has 
been incarcerated since March of 1988. The hearing before the 
lower court occurred on December 18, 1989. Appellant's Docketing 
Statement was filed on March 15, 1990. Had the State truly 
believed that there was no jurisdiction in this case it could and 
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should have filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to 
Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure thereby 
eliminating a substantial time period for Defendant to prepare his 
brief, for the State to reply, and for argument to be heard. 
There is, therefore, no legal justification nor equitable reason 
to require Defendant to start over once again in another court 
thereby severely prolonging his incarceration if he is entitled to 
a vacation of the plea of no contest. 
For these reasons, therefore, this matter is properly before 
this Court and should be decided on the merits. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE DEFENDANT'S 
PLEA OF NO CONTEST SINCE THE PLEA WAS 
LEGALLY DEFICIENT. 
Defendant believes that his analysis of the law relating to 
guilty pleas is correct in light of both Rule 11 and the Gibbons 
opinion by the Utah Supreme Court. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 
9-32). Since the State has only put forth a cursory effort to 
refute the defendant's factual and legal analysis, only a brief 
review of the State's arguments is required. First, the State 
contends that in "determining if denial was appropriate, this 
Court must consider: (1) whether defendant's no contest plea 
complied with Rule 11, Utah rules of Criminal Procedure and (2) 
whether the trial court met its obligation of insuring that 
defendant entered a voluntary and knowing plea." (Appellee's 
Brief, p. 11). This statement is inaccurate. The purpose of 
Rule 11 is to insure that a voluntary and knowing plea is entered. 
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Thus, the two cannot be separated as the State has done. More 
importantly, however, the State has not addressed the question as 
to whether the no contest plea in this case meets the criteria 
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Gibbons. This criteria 
is over and above the recipe list provided in Rule 11. Unless it 
is complied with a plea cannot be accepted. State v. Gentry, 141 
Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah App., Aug. 24, 1990); State v. Pharris, 
143 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App., Sept. 14, 1990). 
Next, the State contends that the Court properly "asked 
whether Defendant understood the elements of the crime and whether 
he understood that by pleading no contest, he was giving up the 
right to require the State to prove the elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt." (Appellee's Brief, p. 12). The record shows 
that the entire dialogue concerning the elements of the crime as 
well as a synopsis of the defendant's acts between the Court and 
the defendant is as follows: 
THE COURT: Now, do you also understand that if you were 
to go to trial on this matter, that the State would be 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all those 
matters that are listed under the section called 
elements in this affidavit. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And there are some handwritten notations in 
that section as to elements, as to what those elements 
are. Do you understand those? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that the State's obligation 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt relates to each of 
those elements? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And if you plead guilty as proposed, then you 
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will be giving up any rights to require the State to 
prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yesf Your Honor. (July 20, 1987 hearing, 
p. 6) . 
The statement in the affidavit which the Court was referring 
to was as follows: "Attempted abuse of child under 14—attempted 
to touch the genitals of a child under the age of 14 with intent 
to cause sexual gratification or pain." 
It is obvious that neither the dialogue of the Court nor the 
affidavit specifically addressed the facts of this case. The 
affidavit was a mere recitation of the law and did not give anyone 
notice as to any of the circumstances concerning the alleged crime 
perpetrated by the defendant. 
Since the Gibbons court specifically found that a "sufficient 
affidavit" should contain "a synopsis of the defendant's acts that 
establish the elements of the crimes charged" and furthermore 
"that the trial judge should then review the statements in the 
affidavit with the defendant, question the defendant concerning 
his understanding of it, and fulfil the other requirements imposed 
by Rule 11 on the record before accepting the guilty plea" it is 
obvious that this requirement was not met. 
This Court has recently vacated two guilty pleas on the basis 
that the trial court did not comply with the Gibbons requirement 
of explaining the elements and facts of the crime to the defendant 
while taking the plea. In both State v. Gentry, supra, and State 
v. Pharris, supra this Court held that failure to inform a 
defendant of the nature and elements of the offense is fatal to a 
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guilty plea conviction and that a defendant's understanding of the 
elements of the crime charged and how those elements relate to the 
evidence presented may not be presumed. 
The factual synposis given by the county attorney does not 
meet the requirement of Gibbons that an actual dialogue occur 
between the court and the defendant concerning the understanding 
of the elements and the evidence, (Appellee's Brief, p. 15). 
Furthermore, the State has failed to refute the contention of the 
defendant that in cases where a defendant fails to acknowledge a 
memory of the facts giving rise to the crime that the court must 
satisfy itself that sufficient evidence exists independent of the 
defendant's plea. Here, the court made no effort to examine the 
underlying facts even though the court was aware that the 
defendant maintained he had no memory of any wrongdoing. 
The second argument raised by the defendant concerning his 
ability to understand the plea agreement has also not been refuted 
by the State. Instead, the State has merely quoted the same 
language already quoted by the defendant in his brief in which 
counsel for the State indicated that Defendant was going to have 
to "acknowledge responsibility" and where the lower court informs 
him that the programs may not take him if he "claims factually 
that you did not do what you are charged with." (Appellee's Brief, 
pp. 13-14). Again, however, there is no evidence that anyone 
informed the defendant of the extensive requirements of the 
various programs that Defendant actually remember what occurred 
and that he actually believe in his own guilt. The mere 
acknowledging responsibility or in agreeing factually that he must 
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have committed a crime was clearly not sufficient to keep the 
defendant in the therapy programs. 
Defendant believes that he has painstakingly outlined the 
legal requirements of a guilty plea in his opening brief and has 
specifically addressed the two areas which Defendant believes is 
deficient and which require a vacating of the plea. The State has 
simply failed to perform any detailed analysis of these 
contentions and has only superficially claimed that the trial 
court performed its function in light of Rule 11 and Gibbons. 
This is simply not the case however. 
For these reasons, therefore, the trial court erred in 
failing to set aside Defendant's guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
The State has attempted to escape the merits of this case by 
arguing that Defendant is precluded from attempting to vacate his 
plea because of a statute which was passed some two years after 
his plea and which automatically would preclude him from ever 
being able to attack his plea in a direct appeal. Constitutional 
protection as well as common sense precludes the State from 
prevailing in this argument. Furthermore, to require the 
defendant to now initiate a habeas corpus action is equally 
without merit since the State would no doubt argue that that 
action is also precluded by a statute of limitation. The 
defendant has been incarcerated long enough and is entitled to 
have this matter adjudicated before his sentence expires or he is 
naturally parolled. 
The State has failed to refute the contentions of the 
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defendant that the lower court did not comply with the Gibbons 
requirements as to the factual basis of the elements of the 
defendant's crime or as to his understanding of the plea 
agreement. Either or both of these elements is fatal to the 
validity of a no contest plea. 
For these reasons, therefore, the no contest plea of the 
defendant should be vacated and this matter remanded to the lower 
court for further disposition. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Craig S. Cook 
Attorney for Appellant 
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